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Abstract: 
 
To what end should or do we pursue philosophy and how? Meta-philosophical questions along 
these lines have gained more and more interest recently. The collected volume 
“Erkenntnistheorie—Wie und wozu?” (Engl.: “Epistemology—How and to what end?”) aspires 
to raise and tackle issues addressing the meta-epistemological questions “How is epistemology 
practiced and to what end?” (9). Although this aim sounds like a descriptive meta-
epistemological endeavor, it is not surprising that many authors rather argue for normative 
claims surrounding the questions “How and to what end should epistemology be pursued?”. This 
review provides an overview on the collected volume and offers a critical evaluation of its 
overall achievement. 
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To what end should or do we pursue philosophy and how? Meta-philosophical questions along 
these lines have gained more and more interest recently. The collected volume 
“Erkenntnistheorie—Wie und wozu?” (Engl.: “Epistemology—How and to what end?”) aspires 
to raise and tackle issues addressing the meta-epistemological questions “How is epistemology 
practiced and to what end?” (9). Although this aim sounds like a descriptive meta-
epistemological endeavor, it is not surprising that many authors rather argue for normative 
claims surrounding the questions “How and to what end should epistemology be pursued?”. This 
review provides an overview on the collected volume and offers a critical evaluation of its 
overall achievement. 
 
The editors Dirk Koppelberg and Stefan Tolksdorf compiled 13 new articles in German and 
supplemented them by a translated article by Joshua Shephard and Michael Bishop as well as 
translations of three articles by John Greco, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa, respectively, 
which have already been published elsewhere. The volume is structured into seven parts. The 
first part “Einleitung: Warum Metaerkenntnistheorie?” (Engl.: “Introduction: Why meta-
epistemology?”) contains a single piece: a general introduction by the editors summarizing every 
article of the volume in a rather detailed way. It provides a good overview of the content of the 
book and is thus highly recommended to all readers—independent of how selectively the volume 
is intended to be read. Apart from taking stock of current and past epistemological debates, the 
three articles of the second part “Perspektiven der Erkenntnistheorie” (Engl.: “Epistemology’s 
perspectives”) already address the question of how epistemology should be pursued in the future. 
Ansgar Beckermann pleads for giving up the endeavor of analyzing the concept of knowledge 
and instead advocates focusing on truth criteria and reliable methods for acquiring beliefs 
(“Erkenntnistheorie ohne Wissensbegriff”, Engl.: “Epistemology without the concept of 
knowledge”). Koppelberg argues against the former claim and suggests supplementing the 
endeavor with (epistemic) value oriented questions (“Brauchen wir eine neue Agenda für die 
Erkenntnistheorie?”, Engl.: “Do we need a new agenda for epistemology?”). The third 
contributor of this part, Tolksdorf, does not offer a third stance on that topic, but argues for 
disjunctivist accounts of justification (“Erkenntnistheorie aus disjunktivistischer Perspektive”, 
Engl.: “Epistemology from a disjunctivist point of view”). From a reader’s perspective, it is 
somewhat surprising that this first part is not placed last, because the following parts proceed 
from taking a look at more traditional epistemology to alternative approaches, and then to new 
approaches and to further claims for re-orienting epistemological research. More specifically, 
the third part “Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie (I): Spielarten der Begriffsanalyse” (Engl.: 
“Methodology of epistemology (I): Varieties of conceptual analysis”) deals in four articles with 
issues surrounding conceptual analysis and their application to one of the central topics in 
epistemology: the analysis of knowledge. Peter Baumann makes the case for a more moderate 
aim of conceptual analysis, namely to (merely) identify necessary conditions (“Begriffe 
analysieren?”, Engl.: “Analyzing concepts?”). Pritchard’s aim is twofold: He first argues that the 
common picture of epistemology is too simplistic; epistemologists base their work on different 
kinds of intuitions of unequal weight. He then argues that—thus understood – some anti-
armchair objections are misguided (“Die Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie”, Engl.: “The 
methodology of epistemology”). Gerhard Ernst defends conceptual analysis as a methodological 
tool for epistemology, but he provides reasons to favor a variant which focus on considering 
common cases instead of extraordinary cases (“Beispiele in der Erkenntnistheorie”, Engl.: 
“Examples in epistemology”). The final contribution of this part by Sven Bernecker does not add 
a further stance on conceptual analysis, but a new proposal on how to define the notion of 
knowledge. He argues that it is crucial to add a condition stating that the state of affairs 
corresponding to one’s justificatory reasons has to be in a specific relation to the state of affairs 
which are the truth makers of the proposition at hand (“Die identifikationistische Lösung des 
Gettierproblems”, Engl.: “The identificatory solution to the Gettier problem”). Approaches that 
are more empirical in nature are treated in the fourth part “Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie 
(II): Spielarten des Naturalismus” (Engl.: “Methodology of epistemology (II): Varieties of 
naturalism”), which addresses in four articles naturalism in epistemology and the recently 
evolved so-called experimental philosophy. Markus Wild argues that knowledge is an epistemic 
state which is shared by humans and other animals. Instances of knowledge are instances of 
specifically qualified representations (“Wer den Pavian versteht …”, Engl. “Who understands 
the baboon …”). Shephard and Bishop argue against radical armchair epistemology and radical 
naturalized epistemology and plead for a moderate naturalized epistemology in which both 
intuitions and scientific evidence play a central role (“Argumente für die naturalisierte 
Erkenntnistheorie”, Engl.: “The case for naturalized epistemology”). Koppelberg is concerned 
with experimental epistemology and presents his so-called cooperative naturalized epistemology, 
which is a specification of Shephard and Bishop’s general account (“Wozu experimentelle 
Erkenntnistheorie?”, Engl.: “To what end should we pursue experimental epistemology?”). 
While Shephard, Bishop, and Koppelberg aim at uniting experimental philosophy and armchair 
philosophy’s focus on intuitions, Joachim Horvath defends the latter by arguing that 
experimental philosophy does not pose a genuine challenge for armchair philosophy on closer 
inspection (“Was ist eigentlich die Herausforderung durch die Experimentelle Philosophie?”, 
Engl.: “What challenge does experimental philosophy actually pose?”). Another more recent 
approach, namely virtue epistemology, is of focal interest of the three articles of the fifth part 
“Neuorientierung der Erkenntnistheorie (I): Tugenderkenntnistheorie” (Engl.: “Re-orientation of 
epistemology (I): Virtue epistemology”). Sosa offers a further defense of armchair philosophy 
focusing on epistemology. Inter alia, he claims that genuine dissents among philosophers would 
be a crucial challenge for armchair philosophy, but argues that experimental philosophy does not 
reveal such dissents (“Kann es Philosophie als Disziplin geben? Und kann sie auf Intuitionen 
gegründet werden?”, Engl.: “Can there be a discipline of philosophy? And can it be founded on 
intuition?”). Greco presents and defends his virtue epistemology account of knowledge, in which 
abilities play a crucial role for acquiring knowledge (“Wissen und auf Fähigkeiten beruhender 
Erfolg”, Engl. “Knowledge and success resulting from abilities”). Tolksdorf concludes this part 
by continuing his plea for disjunctivist accounts of justification. He criticizes Sosa’s virtue 
epistemology account by arguing that it can only be successful if Sosa gives up his fallibilist 
account of manifesting epistemic virtues and employs a non-fallibilist account instead 
(“Tugenderkennnistheorie, Wissen und epistemischer Zufall—Ein Argument gegen nicht-
disjunktivistische Tugenderkenntnistheorien des Wissens”, Engl.: “Virtue epistemology, 
knowledge and epistemic luck—An argument against non-disjunctivist virtue theories of 
knowledge”). The sixth part “Neuorientierung der Erkenntnistheorie (II): Wissensforschung” 
(Engl.: “Re-orientation of epistemology (II): Studies of knowledge”) consists of two proposals to 
substantially broaden epistemology to take into consideration the various forms of knowledge 
and their acquisition. By pointing out that the different forms of knowledge are interrelated, 
Günter Abel argues that epistemologists’ focus on knowledge-that is too narrow and needs to be 
broadened. As a start he offers a detailed taxonomy of knowledge (“Wissensforschung—
Erweiterungen und Revisionen der Epistemologie”, Engl.: “Studies of knowledge—Extensions 
and revisions of epistemology”). Martina Plümacher, the volume’s only female contributor, 
emphasizes that human knowledge is inherently perspectival by virtue of being necessarily 
selective. She then outlines the implication of this thesis for how to conduct epistemological 
research in a fruitful way and examines the relation between this perspectivalism and 
contextualism (“Erkenntnisperspektiven und ihre Kontexte”, Engl.: “Perspectives of knowledge 
and their contexts”). The book ends how it started: with a single piece constituting the seventh 
part “Schluss: Dissense in der Erkenntnistheorie” (Engl.: “Conclusion: Disagreement in 
epistemology”). This conclusion, written by Thomas Grundmann, is devoted to disagreements in 
philosophy. He argues that stable dissents are due to epistemic equality of the involved parties 
and that they require us to refrain from judgment. He then tries to show that many dissents in 
philosophy turn out to be non-stable, because equality of parties is not given (“Die 
Epistemologie stabiler Dissense in der Philosophie”, Engl.: “The epistemology of stable dissents 
in philosophy”). 
 
That the volume is rich in content and offers new perspectives is beyond doubt. I focus my 
evaluation on its overall achievement regarding its meta-epistemological approach. In their 
introduction, Koppelberg and Tolksdorf claim that meta-epistemology is a new topic in 
philosophical debates and that their volume addresses the most important stances taken so far 
(9). Compared to classical companions to epistemology, the volume at hand is indeed unique in 
having meta-epistemological issues as its core theme. However, the claim that the volume offers 
something new needs to be qualified in at least two respects. First of all, the book is not meta-
epistemology all the way down. Even though many of the collected articles focus on descriptive 
or normative meta-epistemological questions, some also deal with typical  
(non-meta-)epistemological questions, such as Tolksdorf’s plea for disjunctivism, Bernecker’s 
proposal of how to solve the Gettier problem, Wild’s analysis of knowledge, and Greco’s virtue 
epistemology account. This is not say that these papers do not make valuable contributions to 
their respective debates, but the general introduction does not render it crystal clear why these 
spots have not been filled by meta-epistemological articles or by articles which focus on the 
meta-epistemological implications of such accounts. Secondly, some of the articles dealing with 
meta-issues address philosophy in general rather than epistemology in particular, such as 
Baumann’s stance on analyzing concepts, Horvath’s evaluation of experimental philosophy, as 
well as Grundmann’s analysis of dissents in philosophy. Such papers would better fit into 
volumes on meta-philosophy, such as the recently published “The Palgrave handbook of 
philosophical methods” (Daly 2015). Again, pointing this out does not aim at diminishing the 
respective authors' contributions. However, one expects a collection on meta-epistemology to 
focus exclusively on meta-epistemological issues, be it by analyzing the peculiarities of 
epistemology or by applying meta-philosophical stances on epistemology, such as Ernst’s 
discussion of the role of examples for epistemological research, Koppelberg’s stance on 
experimental epistemology, and Sosa’s defense of armchair epistemology. 
 
The claim that the book addresses the most important stances taken so far requires qualification 
as well. At least three topics have been left out: Formal epistemology as an alternative to 
traditional epistemology (e.g., Bovens and Hartmann 2003; Huber and Schmidt-Petri 2009; 
Spohn 2012), the explication of epistemological terms as an alternative to conceptual analysis 
(e.g., Craig 1990; Brendel 2013; Olsson 2015), and the recent development of pursuing 
reductionist claims in epistemology, such as approaches to reduce all pieces of knowledge to 
knowledge-that (e.g., Stanley and Williamson 2001; Brogaard 2009) or reducing instances of 
understanding to corresponding instances of knowledge (e.g., Grimm 2006; Kelp 2014; 
Sliwa 2015). Concerning the limits of the book, one should also note that epistemologists’ recent 
turn to other epistemic states, such as the current debate about understanding (e.g., 
Kvanvig 2003; Elgin 2007; Greco 2014; Hills 2015), gets only little attention. 
 
That these topics are not addressed in the volume does not render the latter’s scope small, 
though. The volume is comprehensive, tackles many central issues, and paves the ground for 
fruitful meta-epistemological debates in the future. It is thus definitely worth studying. Hence, it 
seems a pity that the collection will not be easily accessible to non-German speakers. 
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